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PUBLIC WILDLIFE ON PRIVATE LAND:
UNIFYING THE SPLIT ESTATE TO ENHANCE
TRUST RESOURCES
REED WATSON†
ABSTRACT
In the United States, wildlife is a publicly owned resource, yet the
majority of wildlife habitat is privately owned. This division of
ownership has perpetuated conflicts over such topics as endangered
species, public hunting access, and crop depredation. Tensions arise
not only between private property rights and the public interest, which
are both regrettably dynamic legal concepts, but more fundamentally
over the division of economic rents generated from the combination of
public wildlife and private habitat.
This Article examines the nature of the split wildlife estate and the
potential to unify it with public-private partnerships. A review of the
public trust doctrine and its historical evolution reveals that state
governments can and, in many instances, should share with private
landowners the financial benefits of wildlife stewardship—not only the
costs. Two case studies demonstrate how unifying the split wildlife
estate can lead to improvements in wildlife habitat and an increase in
the health and value of wildlife resources.
INTRODUCTION
On a crisp morning in August of 2002, Jay Newell shot the
1
biggest elk of his life. Newell estimated that the mature bull weighed
more than 1,000 pounds, a trophy by almost anyone’s standard, yet
2
the harvest was not cause for celebration. As he walked towards the
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1. Tom Dickson, The Elk Next Door: Why One Person’s Prized (or Profitable) Elk Has
Become Another Person’s Elk Depredation Problem, MONT. OUTDOORS, Nov.–Dec., 2003,
available at fwp.mt.gov/mtoutdoors/HTML/articles/2003/elkdepredation.htm.
2. Id.
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downed animal, there were no high-fives or pats on the back from
hunting companions. This was no typical elk hunt. It was a culling
3
operation intended to limit property damage.
Newell, a wildlife biologist for Montana Fish, Wildlife, and
Parks, had spent the night attempting to haze elk out of irrigated
4
agricultural fields twenty-five miles east of Billings, Montana. On the
ranch where he shot the bull, a herd of elk had been gorging for
5
weeks on rows of corn, beets, and alfalfa. When noise makers and
professional herders failed to drive the animals back onto the forested
public land to the south, the state agency decided that shooting some
6
of the animals was the only remaining option.
Culling herds with sharpshooters is not how state wildlife
agencies prefer to manage game populations, but such measures have
become more common as wildlife exact an increasing financial toll on
7
farmers and ranchers. In the years leading up to the above incident,
Steve Sian, the ranch owner, had lost as much as fifteen percent of his
annual crop to elk depredation, a non-trivial amount in an industry
8
that fluctuates with the weather. Sian had given dozens of locals
permission to hunt on the property, but they were unsuccessful at
9
reducing the herd’s numbers or its impact. Elk adapt quickly to
hunting pressure and often wait until after dark to enter agricultural
10
fields. Additionally, neighboring ranches that allowed very little or
no hunting became safe havens where the elk could retreat during the
day. Like many landowners, Sian had previously enjoyed seeing elk
and other wildlife on his property, but that enjoyment faded when

3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Montana still uses game damage hunts as a means to reduce property damage caused
by high wildlife concentrations, and Montana Fish, Wildlife and Parks enlists private citizens
from a Game Damage Hunt Roster to participate in the culling operations. See Game Damage
Hunts
and
Management
Seasons,
MONT.
FISH,
WILDLIFE
&
PARKS,
http://fwp.mt.gov/hunting/seasons/damage.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2013) (enabling private
citizens to enlist in a Game Damage Hunt Roster for culling operations organized by Montana
Fish, Wildlife and Parks to reduce property damage caused by wildlife).
8. Dickson, supra note 1.
9. Id.
10. For safety reasons, most states limit legal hunting hours to thirty minutes before
sunrise until thirty minutes after sunset. These limits would not necessarily apply to culling
operations carried out by state wildlife agencies. See, e.g., MONT. FISH, WILDLIFE & PARKS,
DEER, ELK & ANTELOPE HUNTING REGULATIONS 15 (2013).
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their presence began to threaten the ranch’s financial future. Much
of the tension surrounding wildlife management and, in particular,
the management of game species, stems from the fact that wildlife is
12
13
publicly owned, while most wildlife habitat is privately owned. Per
the North American model of wildlife conservation, wild animals are
14
public property managed by each state for the benefit of its citizens.
These public resources are not stationary, however, nor do they
confine themselves to publicly owned and funded lands. Wild animals
such as elk and deer routinely cross onto privately owned property,
where they consume valuable crops, destroy fences, and inflict costly
15
property damage. The result is a kind of split estate—an overlap of
valuable resources, the rights to which are held by separate and
distinct entities. Much like the separation of surface and sub-surface
mineral rights can generate conflicts and inefficiencies in the
16
extraction of minerals and fossil fuels, the division of rights to
wildlife and wildlife habitat has occasioned an increasing number of
conflicts over public access, private property damage, and the
appropriate division of the costs and benefits that wildlife generate.
One approach to minimizing wildlife-landowner conflicts is to
share the benefits and burdens of wildlife stewardship between the
state and private landowners—in essence to unify the split estate so
that private habitat owners have an incentive to act as stewards of the
public’s wildlife resources. The question is whether unification is
legal. The public trust doctrine is an ancient legal concept that
arguably vested public property rights in certain natural resources
and precluded the government from transferring those resources to
17
private parties. If applied broadly to wildlife resources, it could be

11. Dickson, supra note 1.
12. See Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, The Pioneer Spirit and the Public Trust: The
American Rule of Capture and State Ownership of Wildlife, 35 ENVTL. L. 673, 713–19 (2005)
(listing twenty-five state statutes declaring wildlife to be state property).
13. DONALD R. LEAL & J. BISHOP GREWELL, HUNTING FOR HABITAT: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO STATE-LANDOWNER PARTNERSHIPS 3 (1999).
14. MICHAEL J. BEAN & MELANIE J. ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL
WILDLIFE LAW 10–15 (1997); ERIC G. BOLEN & WILLIAM L. ROBINSON, WILDLIFE ECOLOGY
AND MANAGEMENT 3–5 (2003); THOMAS A. LUND, AMERICAN WILDLIFE LAW (1980).
15. Of course, domestic livestock eat crops and destroy fences on private property too.
The critical difference is that livestock are privately owned and generate financial benefits that
the private landowner can legally capture in the marketplace.
16. Timothy Fitzgerald, Evaluating Split Estates in Oil and Gas Leasing, 86 LAND
ECON. 294, 294 (2010).
17. Compare Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 490 (1970), with James L. Huffman, Speaking of
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used to prohibit private landowners from acquiring an ownership
18
interest in wildlife or influencing how wildlife is managed.
Consistent with the doctrine’s historical foundation, courts have
struck down sovereign transfers of certain lands and natural resources
19
when those transfers served no obvious public interest. For decades,
however, legal scholars have argued for expanding the public trust
doctrine beyond its historical scope to prohibit not only states from
alienating or abrogating control over trust resources, but also to
20
erode private contracts and property rights. Courts have adopted
this expansive formulation of the doctrine to undo surface water
21
transfers and to recognize public access rights over private land
22
where none had previously existed. The application of the public
trust doctrine to wildlife has the potential to alter the allocation of
rights and responsibilities significantly between state wildlife agencies

Inconvenient Truths–A History of the Public Trust Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1
(2007) (presenting contrasting views of the public trust doctrine and its application).
18. See, e.g., RICK APPLEGATE, PUBLIC TRUSTS: A NEW APPROACH TO
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 56–57 (1976) (concluding that wildlife should be placed in the
public trust, with the national public as beneficiary for all wildlife); Patrick Redmond, The
Public Trust in Wildlife: Two Steps Forward, Two Steps Back, 49 NAT. RESOURCES J. 249, 249
(2009) (describing the inconsistent and “bumpy” application of the doctrine to wildlife
resources); Susan Morath Horner, Embryo, Not Fossil: Breathing Life into the Public Trust in
Wildlife, 35 LAND & WATER L. REV. 23, 74 (2000) (arguing that the public trust doctrine
generally precludes all dispositions of wildlife resources to private interests and abdications of
wildlife management responsibilities). See generally Deborah G. Musiker et al., The Public Trust
and Parens Patriae Doctrines: Protecting Wildlife in Uncertain Political Times, 16 PUB. LAND L.
REV. 87 (1995); Gary D. Meyers, Variation on a Theme: Expanding the Public Trust Doctrine to
Include Protection of Wildlife, 19 ENVTL. L. 723 (1989) (proposing that the scope of the public
trust doctrine be expanded to encompass all wildlife and the habitat upon which it depends and
arguing that the approach is jurisprudentially sound given the similarity between water and
wildlife).
19. See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452–53 (1892) (holding that the public
trust doctrine would not sanction “the abdication of the general control of the state over lands
under the navigable waters of an entire harbor or bay, or of a sea or lake”).
20. Sax, supra note 17, at 490; see also David Takacs, The Public Trust Doctrine,
Environmental Human Rights, and the Future of Private Property, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 711,
711–13 (2008) (proposing a synthesis of the public trust doctrine and human rights in response
to climate change and other modern environmental issues).
21. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct., 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983) (holding that the state of
California has an affirmative duty to consider the public trust in the planning and allocation of
water resources and to protect public trust uses such as recreational and aesthetic values
whenever feasible).
22. Mont. Coalition of Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 171 (Mont. 1984) (holding
that the public trust doctrine created a public right of access to privately owned stream beds
underlying all waterways capable of recreational use in the state).
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and private landowners and to exacerbate the controversies and rent
dissipation caused by the split wildlife estate.
This Article examines how the public trust doctrine influences
the management of public wildlife on private land and whether,
consistent with the doctrine, states can transfer ownership and
management of wildlife to private landowners. Part I explains the
split estate dilemma of managing public wildlife on private land. Part
II outlines the history of the public trust doctrine as it applies to
wildlife resources, finding little historical evidence to suggest state
governments are as constrained by the doctrine as some
commentators have suggested. Parts III and IV reflect on the success
of public-private partnerships and explain how contracting with
private landowners for wildlife stewardship services is consistent with
states’ wildlife trusteeship and, in some instances, might be necessary
to maximize public wildlife values in the face of the split wildlife
estate. Part V concludes.
I. THE SPLIT WILDLIFE ESTATE
For many, the image of a deer or an elk meandering through a
wilderness area epitomizes the North American conservation
model—abundant wildlife inhabiting public land “where the earth
24
and its community of life are untrammeled by man.” Though the
United States has sizeable endowments of both wildlife and publicly
25
owned lands, the distribution of these resources does not perfectly
align. In the West, where the ratio of public to private land is highest,
the asymmetry is somewhat seasonal. Large ungulates summer in
higher elevation terrain, which is typically federally owned, until
scarce food and cold temperatures force them out of the mountains

23. See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 12, at 713–19 (2005) (describing the additional
regulatory authority and legal rights conferred to states by the public trust doctrine over and
above those available under states’ police powers); John D. Echeverria & Julie Lurman,
“Perfectly Astounding” Public Rights: Wildlife Protection and the Takings Clause, 16 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 331, 355 (2003) (“In keeping with the leading public trust decisions involving water
resources or tidelands, [state ownership] language could be interpreted to mean that the
doctrine of public ownership of wildlife supports imposing affirmative obligations on
government officials to protect wildlife.”).
24. See The Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. § 1131 (1964).
25. See ROSS W. GORTE ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42346, FEDERAL LAND
OWNERSHIP: OVERVIEW AND DATA 1 (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
misc/R42346.pdf (noting the federal government owns and manages approximately 640 million
acres of land, or roughly twenty-eight percent of the nation’s total land area).
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and onto private land. In Eastern and Midwestern states, where the
percentage of private land ownership is much higher, publicly owned
wildlife is more likely to occupy private land year-round.
Whether seasonal or year-round, the presence of public wildlife
on private land creates a situation similar to a split estate of surface
and mineral rights; specifically, the ownership of overlying resources
is held by separate and distinct entities. The economic incentives and
resulting legal principles surrounding split mineral and surface estates
27
have been studied in significant detail and are worth considering in
the context of public wildlife and private wildlife habitat. With a
unified surface and sub-surface estate, the single owner bears the full
costs and benefits of her actions and unilaterally determines where,
when, how, and at what rate to extract the sub-surface resources. By
contrast, when the surface and sub-surface rights are held by two
different parties, conflicts routinely emerge over issues of access,
waste disposal, allocation of liability, and, in general, the hierarchy of
28
the divided property rights. As Chouinard and Steinhoff explain in
the context of coal-bed methane extraction:
Subsurface rights give energy companies surface access, but exactly
what that means for overlying landowners remains highly uncertain
and requires negotiation on a case-by-case basis between the
parties. In general, negotiations to date have not quieted landowner
resentment over the intrusion of energy companies on their land.
From the perspective of energy companies, failed negotiations
result in costly delays (even foregone development) in gas
29
extraction and possible legal action.

In the context of public wildlife on private land, the split estate
conflict usually centers on three issues: public access, private property
30
damage, and the claimed privatization of public wildlife. The issue of
public access concerns whether the presence of a publicly owned
26. See, e.g., Laura Lundquist, Judge: Bison Can Winter in More of Park County,
BOZEMAN DAILY CHRON. (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.bozemandailychronicle.com/news/wildlife/
article_b38e4c48-590f-11e2-8a01-001a4bcf887a.html.
27. See, e.g., Andrew C. Mergen, The Problem of Federal/Private Split Estate Lands, 33
LAND & WATER L. REV. 419 (1998); Andrew M. Miller, A Journey through Mineral Estate
Dominance, the Accommodation Doctrine, and Beyond: Why Texas Is Ready to Take the Next
Step with a Surface Damage Act, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 461 (2003); Drake D. Hill & P. Jaye Rippley,
The Split Estate: Communication and Education versus Legislation, 4 WYO. L. REV. 585 (2004).
28. See Hayley H. Chouinard & Christina Steinhoff, Split-Estate Negotiations: The Case of
Coal-Bed Methane, 4 REV. L. & ECON. 233, 236–38 (2008) (explaining some of the conflicts that
split mineral and surface estates can create).
29. Id. at 234.
30. The latter, which is the primary focus of this article, typically concerns a division of
economic rents between the state as owner of the wildlife and private landowners or outfitters.
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resource on private land creates a public access right or easement
over that private land. Several courts have recognized such rights with
respect to water flowing across private property. For instance,
Montana has recognized a public access right to all streams capable of
31
recreational use regardless of streambed ownership. Therefore,
anglers in Montana are legally entitled to walk through private
property so long as they remain below a stream’s mean high water
mark. By contrast, Colorado law forbids boaters, anglers, and other
recreationists from touching privately owned streambeds underlying
32
non-navigable waters. No Western state has yet recognized a public
access right across private land based solely on the presence of
33
terrestrial wildlife, perhaps because the stream access disputes have
34
been so contentious. Nonetheless, given the similarities between
water and wildlife—both are publicly owned, fugitive resources
managed by state governments for the benefit of the public—and the
expanding conception of the public trust doctrine described below, a
lawsuit seeking to apply the stream access rationale to terrestrial
wildlife is likely.
The property damage issue concerns whether private landowners
should be compensated for financial injury caused by publicly owned
wildlife. Whereas the access issue raises a question of public rights,
the property damage issue raises a question of public responsibility—
namely, whether the state should bear the cost of wildlife forage and
property damage on private lands. The answer to this question has
significant financial implications. Jim Knight estimates the annual
cost of wildlife forage on private property in Montana alone is $31.5
31. Mont. Coalition of Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 171 (Mont. 1984); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 23-2-302(1) (2012); see also Bitterroot River Protective Assn. v. Bitterroot
Conservation Dist., 198 P.3d 219, 242 (Mont. 2008) (holding the public has a right to access
privately owned and operated irrigation ditches containing fugitive waters capable of
appropriation).
32. See, e.g., People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Colo. 1979) (“It is the general rule of
property law recognized in Colorado that the land underlying non-navigable streams is the
subject of private ownership and is vested in the proprietors of the adjoining lands.”). Despite
this precedent, recent legislative efforts in Colorado have attempted to exempt stream
recreationists from the state’s civil trespass laws. H.B. 10-1188, 67th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo.
2010).
33. Curran, 682 P.2d at 171, had the practical effect of allowing the public to wade and fish
on privately owned property, but the decision was based on the presence of state owned water.
34. Deborah B. Schmidt, Public Trust Doctrine in Montana: Conflict at the Headwaters, 19
ENVTL. L. 675, 678 (1988) (discussing how “[following Curran,] direct conflict between
landowner and recreationist rights in water is likely to occur unless water users, administrators,
and public policy makers work to develop a consensus on reasonable and equitable ways to
share the resource and deal with its shortages”).
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35

million. Private landowners bear these costs, plus the costs of
repairing countless miles of wildlife-damaged fences, usually without
any compensation from the state as legal owner of the wildlife.
Though some Western states have big game compensation
36
programs, most do not, and private landowners have a very low
37
probability of recovering damages in court.
The opposite of the cost allocation issue is the question of
revenue allocation: namely, whether and under what circumstances
states should share the economic rents generated by publicly owned
38
wildlife with private landowners. Some commentators have argued
that states must use financial incentives to motivate landowners to
39
engage in wildlife habitat improvements. Several others have
concluded that rent sharing amounts to the privatization of public
wildlife, which contradicts the North American conservation model

35. JIM KNIGHT & CAROLYN NISTLER, MONT. ST. UNIV. EXTENSION, THE
CONTRIBUTIONS OF LANDOWNERS TO BIG GAME IN MONTANA 2 (2007), available at
http://msuextension.org/publications/OutdoorsEnvironmentandWildlife/MT200604AG.pdf.
36. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 36-1108 (2012) (outlining an elaborate compensation
program for wildlife forage on private land). The Canadian provinces have similar programs.
See Kimberly K. Wagner et al., Compensation Programs for Wildlife Damage in North America,
25 WILDLIFE SOC’Y BULL. 315, 324 (1997) (finding that seven provinces have compensation
programs).
37. See Montana v. Rathbone, 100 P.2d 86, 95 (Mont. 1940) (“We again call attention to
the fact that wild animals are the property of the State, and the State cannot be sued without its
consent; whereas the owner of property, damaged by trespassing cattle or other livestock, may
sue for damages, and, if the trespasses are repeated, he may also apply for injunctive relief
against the owner of the livestock.”).
38. It is necessary to distinguish between revenues derived from the permission to hunt a
particular parcel of private land, which permission is given or withheld by the private
landowner, and revenues derived from hunting permits, which are issued by state wildlife
agencies. Private landowners throughout the West lease hunting access, primarily to big game,
waterfowl, and upland bird hunters, but these leases concern only access to the property.
Without the required licenses and permits, access is of little value to a hunter. States that convey
transferable hunting permits to private landowners are granting those landowners influence
over the allocation of hunting opportunities, such as the right to take game animals, and it is this
delegation of management authority that fuels the claims of wildlife privatization. See generally
Pallab Mozumder et al., Lease and Fee Hunting on Private Lands in the U.S.: A Review of the
Economic and Legal Issues, 12 HUMAN DIMENSIONS OF WILDLIFE 1 (2007) (describing the
various types of wildlife related income earned by private landowners).
39. See Patrick F. Noonan & Michael D. Zagata, Wildlife in the Market Place: Using the
Profit Motive to Maintain Wildlife Habitat, 10 WILDLIFE SOC’Y BULL. 46 (1982) (explaining
that, unless the wildlife professional captalizes on the American “profit-motive,” the passive
expectation of private landowners to produce wildlife habitat is not likely to ensure long-term
wildlife health); LEAL & GREWELL, supra note 13, at 2, 4 (1999) (describing how the market,
rather than strained state agencies, provides an incentive for landowners to improve wildlife
habitat and how these habitat improvements benefit game and non-game species).
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40

and jeopardizes wildlife health. Of the issues arising from the split
wildlife estate, revenue allocation is particularly divisive because it
pits legal and equity-based claims for limiting wildlife
commercialization against utilitarian arguments for it.
Strategies for resolving the access, property damage, and revenue
sharing issues that arise from the split wildlife estate are shaped by
the incentives of private landowners and the ability of states, as
trustees of public wildlife, to harness those incentives in the public’s
interest. Specifically, whether private landowners manage their
property for the benefit or detriment of the public’s wildlife depends
on private landowners’ view of wildlife as either an asset or a
41
liability. This largely depends on whether the wildlife imposes a net
cost or generates a net revenue for the landowner. And the ability of
private landowners to generate revenues from public wildlife
ultimately depends on the application of the public trust doctrine to
wildlife. If the doctrine is read to prohibit delegations of management
authority and the division of wildlife revenues entirely, then wildlife
could only indirectly generate revenues for private landowners via
hunting leases and other access-oriented contracts. Because of this,
the problems of split ownership are likely to persist. Conversely, if
courts interpret the public trust doctrine as allowing wildlife transfers
that advance the public interest, state wildlife agencies and private
landowners will enjoy greater latitude to write contracts that resolve
the problems of split ownership.
In short, the primary mechanism by which states can motivate
private landowners to enhance wildlife habitat or increase public
access is by unifying the split estate and then transferring the wildlife
ownership interest to those landowners. Whether such a transfer
would survive judicial scrutiny depends on two factors: the court’s
42
willingness to apply the public trust doctrine to wildlife and the
court’s interpretation of the public trust doctrine’s history.

40. See Paul Robbins & April Luginbuhl, The Last Enclosure: Resisting Privatization of
Wildlife in the Western United States, 16 CAPITALISM NATURE SOCIALISM 45 (2006) (extolling
the grass roots, bureaucratic, and political opposition to public-private sharing of wildlife
revenues); Valerius Geist, How Markets in Wildlife Meat and Parts, and the Sale of Hunting
Privileges, Jeopardize Wildlife Conservation, 2 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 15, 23 (1988)
(describing paid hunting as a deterrent that excludes low income hunters, reduces hunting
participation rates, and threatens the health of wildlife populations).
41. See Noonan & Zagata, supra note 39, at 46 (1982) (describing how “many landowners
are willing, in fact eager, to maintain wildlife habitat if it results in economic gain”).
42. See Redmond, supra note 18, at 304 (“[T]he path to judicial recognition of the public
trust in wildlife has not been smooth. Indeed, this path has been so crisscrossed and rutted with
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II. WILDLIFE IN THE PUBLIC TRUST
The principles of legal trusts arise in wildlife management via the
public trust doctrine. Specifically, states hold wildlife in trust for the
43
benefit of their citizens. This legal construct did not arise via a trust
document or grant by the federal government, but first as a practical
necessity under Roman law and later as a default rule under English
common law. Like all common law principles, the public trust
doctrine is not a static legal concept; it has evolved and will continue
to evolve as courts apply the doctrine to new facts and circumstances.
But because precedent binds these courts, the history of the public
trust doctrine provides some limitation to the doctrine’s application.
Therefore, it is important to understand this history to contextualize
the current controversies over wildlife management on private land.
Before examining the history in detail, the following primer on trust
law describes the basic operation of public trusts with particular
attention to the rights and responsibilities they create.
A. Trust Law Fundamentals
Though the public trust doctrine has been expanded to natural
resources not contemplated by its Roman and common law origins,
the operation of the trust vehicle—particularly the rights and
responsibilities arising under the trust relationship—remains
unchanged. Legal trusts can take many forms and serve a number of
purposes, but the basic structure of all legal trusts is the same. A trust
is a relationship whereby one person or entity manages property for
44
the benefit of another. Typically, a “grantor” or “donor” entrusts

competing doctrines of constitutional limitations, property rights, and statutory and agency
mandates that drawing generalizations across state lines invites oversimplification.”). For
example, after the Idaho Supreme Court declared the doctrine applicable to wildlife in
Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, 671 P.2d 1085 (Idaho 1983), the Idaho
legislature enacted a provision which expressly declared that Idaho’s public trust doctrine was
“solely a limitation on the power of the state to alienate or encumber the title to the beds of
navigable waters.” IDAHO CODE ANN. § 58-1203 (2002) (emphasis added).
43. BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 14 at 10–15; Redmond, supra note 18; Darren K.
Cottriel, The Right to Hunt in the Twenty-First Century: Can the Public Trust Doctrine Save an
American Tradition?, 27 PAC. L.J. 1235, 1266–69 (1996); Cal. Trout, Inc. v. State Water Res.
Control Bd., 207 Cal. App. 3d 585, 630 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that title to wild fish is
vested in the state and held by it as trustee for the common ownership and use of the people); In
re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980) (holding that, under the public trust
doctrine, the Commonwealth of Virginia and the United States have the right and the duty to
protect and preserve the public’s interest in natural wildlife resources). But see IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 58-1203 (2002).
44. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (2007).

Watson (Do Not Delete)

Spring 2013]

5/19/2013 10:43 PM

PUBLIC WILDLIFE ON PRIVATE LAND

301

property to the “trustee” who must manage the trust property for the
benefit of a specified “beneficiary” or charitable purpose. The trustee
holds legal title to the trust property and owes a fiduciary duty to the
45
beneficiary. The beneficiary, in turn, holds equitable title to the
property but cannot consume the trust property in any manner
46
inconsistent with the trust provisions.
47
Trusts can be either public or private. The critical distinction is
whether the beneficiary is an identified individual or group of
individuals or a charitable purpose that benefits society as a whole.
For instance, public trusts may be created with the charitable purpose
of alleviating hunger or increasing adult literacy. On the other hand,
private trusts are created for the benefit of identifiable persons, often
the grantor’s descendants. Regardless of whether a trust is public or
private, the trustee holds a fiduciary obligation to manage the trust
48
property exclusively for the benefit of the beneficiary.
A trustee’s fiduciary obligation subjects the trustee to a strict
legal standard—a higher standard of care than ordinary care. Not
only must a trustee use ordinary, reasonable skill and prudence in the
management of trust property, a trustee must also ensure the trust
49
property is profitable and secure against unreasonable loss. This
fiduciary obligation does not require that the trustee personally
perform all of the tasks required to maintain the trust property, but it
does require that the trustee make the necessary arrangements if
50
third-party assistance is needed. For instance, if the trust property is
real estate, the trustee is not personally obligated to sweep the floors
or clean the windows. However, the trustee is obligated to ensure the
property does not fall into a state of disrepair and, consequently, may
be required to hire professional janitorial services. Similarly, a trustee
of financial funds may be required to hire a professional financial
planner or investment strategist if the management of the trust
property requires a competency beyond that which the trustee
possesses.
Though the trustee owes a strict fiduciary duty to the trust
beneficiary, the trustee enjoys significant discretion in the way she

45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See generally Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its
Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045 (1991).
50. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 80 (2007).
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administers the trust. So long as the trustee manages the trust
property in accordance with the terms of the trust and with an
undivided loyalty to the trust beneficiary, courts are usually hesitant
51
to find a trustee in violation of her fiduciary duty.
Opposite the trustee is the trust beneficiary. Though the
beneficiary holds equitable title to the trust property—the actual
enjoyment and use of the property—the beneficiary does not possess
a right to consume the trust property in any manner inconsistent with
52
the terms of the trust. As such, the trustee’s fiduciary duty to
preserve the trust property from unreasonable loss includes the
obligation to ensure the beneficiary does not consume the trust
property in a manner that frustrates the trust’s purpose. With this
basic understanding of the rights and responsibilities created by legal
trusts, we turn to the history of trust principles as applied to wildlife.
B. Roman Law
The public trust doctrine is a historical concept that most
scholars trace back to sixth century Roman law. Not surprisingly,
given its age, the historical roots of the public trust doctrine are
53
themselves topics of much scholarly and judicial debate. However,
most scholars agree that the story begins with the Justinian Code,
54
completed in 529 A.D.
As to wildlife, Justinian summarized the law of the day as
follows:
Wild beasts, birds, fish and all animals, which live either in the sea,
the air, or the earth, so soon as they are taken by anyone,
immediately become by the law of nations the property of the
captor; for natural reason gives to the first occupant that which had
no previous owner. And it is immaterial whether a man takes wild
beasts or birds upon his own ground, or on that of another. Of
course anyone who enters the ground of another for the sake of

51. See Cooter and Freedman, supra note 49, at 1054.
52. ALASTAIR HUDSON, EQUITY AND TRUSTS 54–55 (2009).
53. See generally Huffman, supra note 17 (documenting the doctrine’s historical
foundations and controversial application in current jurisprudence).
54. Matthew E. Pecoy, Sitting on the Dock of the Bay: South Carolina’s Need for a General
Submerged Land Lease Program, 15 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 281, 282 (2006) (quoting
JUSTINIAN, THE JUSTINIAN INST. 35 § 2.1.1 (J. B. Moyle trans., 5th ed. 1913)) (“By the law of
nature these things are common to mankind—the air, running water, the sea, and consequently
the shores of the sea. No one, therefore, is forbidden to approach the seashore, provided that he
respects habitations, monuments, and buildings which are not, like the sea, subject only to the
law of nations.”).
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hunting or fowling, may be prohibited by the proprietor, if he
55
perceives his intention of entering.

Citing “special rules for bees, pigeons, peacocks, geese and other
fowl that might leave their owners’ land but would return of their own
accord,” Huffman notes that “wild creatures were owned by no one,
not because they were thought to be owned by everyone, but because
establishing private ownership required establishing special rules
56
adapted to their wild nature.” According to Huffman, “[i]f there was
a right held in common [under Roman law] it was the right to acquire
57
private ownership of wild animals by capturing them.”
The inability of Roman law to define ownership of wildlife by
any other rule than capture thus necessitated that ownership be
shared in common until such capture was made. However, communal
ownership of wildlife resources is by no means synonymous with
sovereign trusteeship for exclusive public benefit. According to
Patrick Deveney:
Roman law was innocent of the idea of trusts, had no idea at all of a
“public” (in the sense we use the term) as the beneficiary of such a
trust, allowed no legal remedies whatever against state allotment of
land, exploited by private monopolies everything (including the sea
and the seashore) that was worth exploiting, and had a general idea
58
of public rights that is quite alien to our own.

As such, there appears to be no support in Roman law for the
claim that the public trust doctrine precluded the sovereign’s ability
to transfer ownership of wildlife resources to private individuals or to
share with private individuals the benefits of cooperatively managed
wildlife populations.
Under Roman law, there was no trust relationship between the
government and the citizenry with regard to wildlife or any other
natural resources; instead, public rights of access appeared to exist
“unless and until a private person or the state required exclusive
59
control of the resource.” Moreover, the ability of private landowners
to exclude the public from hunting and fishing on private land
suggests that private property rights outweighed any public right to
hunt or fish. That wildlife populations were communally owned under

55. Huffman, supra note 17, at 80 (quoting JUSTINIAN, THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN §
2.1.12 (Thomas Cooper trans. & ed., 1841)).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Patrick Deveney, Title, Jus Publicum, and the Public Trust: An Historical Analysis, 1
SEA GRANT L.J. 13, 17 (1976) (internal citation omitted).
59. See id. at 21 (emphasis in original).
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Roman law reflects only the difficulty of defining private rights in
fugitive wildlife resources, not a trust-based restraint on the
sovereign’s ability to alienate or grant exclusive use rights to natural
resources.
C. English Common Law
Because the practical difficulties of defining individual rights in
fugitive wildlife resources had not been solved, the common law of
England similarly treated wildlife as common property subject to the
rule of capture. Lord Bracton wrote that “[t]hings are said to be res
nullius [owned by no one] in several different ways: by nature or the
60
jus naturale, as wild beasts, birds and fish.” According to Blackstone,
however, the common law did eventually evolve to allow a qualified
61
private property right in wildlife. Such a right could be established
according to one of three distinct principles: by capture and
confinement so that wildlife “could not escape and use their natural
liberty” (per industrium); by providing habitat to the offspring of
wildlife species confined to nests or burrows (propter impotentium);
or by “the privilege of hunting, taking, and killing them, in exclusion
of other persons” on private land or on public land granted by the
62
crown for the purpose of taking game (propter privilegium). Absent
these circumstances, title to all wildlife was held by the crown as the
practical shorthand for public ownership and pursuant to the “wise
and orderly maxim, of assigning to everything capable of ownership a
63
legal and determinant owner.”
According to Blackstone, another practical justification for
vesting ownership of wildlife in the crown was to limit the conflict
that would arise under the rule of capture applied to game animals.
Title to those “species of wild animals, which the arbitrary
constitutions of positive law have distinguished from the rest by the
well-known appellation of game,” was held by the crown so as to limit
the “disturbances and quarrels [that] would frequently arise among
individuals, contending about the acquisition of this species of

60. ANDREW ZURCHER, SPENSER’S LEGAL LANGUAGE: LAW AND POETRY IN EARLY
MODERN ENGLAND 145 n.56 (2007) (quoting BRACTON, 2 DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS
ANGLIAE 41 (1256)).
61. Huffman, supra note 17, at 82.
62. Id. at 81 (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 391 (1765)).
63. Id. at 82.
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64

property by first occupancy.” The concern appears to be that
hunters and anglers would quarrel and potentially exhaust game
populations in a race to establish ownership of wildlife via the rule of
capture.
Thus in Europe, despite claims that the natural law prohibited
governments from limiting public access to game, “[t]he sovereigns
have reserved to themselves, and to those to whom they judge proper
to transmit it, the right to hunt all game, and have forbidden hunting
65
to other persons.” By this account, sovereign ownership of game
species did more to restrict public hunting access than enhance it.
Not until the Magna Carta is there evidence of limitations on the
66
sovereign’s ability to alienate commonly owned natural resources.
Chapter Sixteen of the Magna Carta reads: “No riverbanks shall be
placed in defense henceforth except such as were so placed in the
time of King Henry, our grandfather, by the same places and the
67
same bounds as they were wont to be in his time.” This chapter was
eventually understood to be a prohibition on the crown’s granting of
68
exclusive fisheries. According to Blackstone, “making such grants,
and by that means appropriating what seems to be unnatural to
restrain, the use of running water, was prohibited for the future by
King John’s great charter, and the rivers that were fenced in his time
69
were directed to be laid open.”
It should be noted, however, that previous grants of exclusive
hunting and fishing rights were not undone by the Magna Carta and
the King’s authority to make such grants apparently persisted for
70
several centuries after its signing. Indeed, there is evidence to
suggest that the crown could alienate tidal lands and, by association,
grant exclusive hunting and fishing privileges to private individuals
71
long after the Magna Carta. Deveney explains that “there is no
suggestion whatsoever of a public trust in Lord Hale’s writings, and
he recognizes no limitations on the power of the Crown to convey

64. Id.
65. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 524 (1896) (quoting POTHIER, TRAITE DU DROIT
DE PROPRIETE, NOS. 27-28 (1772)).
66. Jan S. Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign’s Ancient Prerogative Becomes the
People’s Environmental Right, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 195, 197–200 (1980).
67. MAGNA CARTA, CHAPT. 16, ART. 20 (Eng. 1225).
68. Huffman, supra note 17, at 20.
69. Id. at 23 n.121.
70. Id. at 20.
71. Id. at 20–23.
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72

title to the coastal area.” Similarly, Hale acknowledged that title to
submerged and tidal land could be and most often was privately
owned and that it could be acquired by usage, custom, prescription, or
73
conveyance from the Crown. Hale also explained “there is no public
right to fish in navigable waters, though the public may be granted the
74
liberty to do so.”
Though the Magna Carta is often cited as the first explicit
restraint on the sovereign’s ability to alienate certain natural
resources, it did not create a sovereign trusteeship in wildlife
resources and had little effect on restraining resource alienation by
the sovereign. According to historical accounts, the crown often
transferred to private individuals the title to commonly owned lands
75
as well as the exclusive hunting and fishing rights on those lands. Not
until centuries later, in a sequence of American cases, was the public
trust doctrine interpreted as providing any meaningful restraint on
sovereign alienation of wildlife resources.
D. American Jurisprudence
Following the American Revolution, state governments
succeeded the English Crown as sovereign trustees of public lands
and other communally owned resources. The rights and
responsibilities of the state governments vis-à-vis their citizenry were
unknown and frequently disputed, as suggested by the extensive body
of case law discussed below. Emerging from this case law is a theme
relevant to wildlife management today: although the public trust
doctrine limits the alienability of trust resources, it does not preclude
76
alienation that benefits the public interest.
77
First in the lineage of early American cases is Arnold v. Mundy,
a case concerning the ownership of tidal lands and oyster beds along

72. Deveney, supra note 58, at 48.
73. MATTHEW HALE, A TREATISE DE JURE MARIS ET BRACHIORUM EJUSDEM (1735),
reprinted in STUART A. MOORE, A HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE AND THE LAW RELATING
THERETO 370 (1888).
74. Id. at 377.
75. Deveney, supra note 58, at 33.
76. Many of the cases that mark this evolution involve disputes of ownership to tidal lands,
not wildlife. Because most conceptions of the public trust doctrine group these together as trust
resources, these tidal land cases are relevant to this wildlife management inquiry. As explained
below, some state courts and legislatures have expressly narrowed the application of the public
trust doctrine to submerged lands, while others have explicitly included wildlife as a trust
resource. See Redmond, supra note 18, at 259–304.
77. 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821).
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New Jersey’s Rariton River. Though the riparian landowner had
planted and maintained the oyster beds in question, and could trace
title to the tidal land to the King of England, the New Jersey Supreme
Court ruled the tidal lands and the overlying oyster beds were
“common to all citizens, and that each has a right to use them
according to his necessities, subject only to the laws which regulate
78
that use.” To reach this conclusion, the court nullified the original
land transfer from the King of England as an invalid transfer of
79
common property. In support of this conclusion, the court cited the
Magna Carta, as well as English common law according to the
80
expansive interpretations of Blackstone, Hale, and Bracton. Relying
on these commentators, the Arnold court concluded that the citizens
of New Jersey held “the legal estate and the usufruct [and] may make
such disposition of them, and such regulation concerning them as they
may think fit . . . [through] the legislative body, who are the
81
representatives of the people for this purpose.”
The court held that the New Jersey legislature may develop the
commonly owned natural resources “at the public expense, or they
may authorize others to do it by their own labour, and at their own
expense, giving them reasonable tolls, rents, profits, or exclusive
82
enjoyments.” However, the court described the state legislature’s
powers as:
. . . nothing more than what is called the jus regium, the right of
regulating, improving, and securing for the common benefit of
every individual citizen. The sovereign power itself, therefore,
cannot, consistently with the principles of the law of nature and the
constitution of a well ordered society, make a direct and absolute
grant of the waters of the state, divesting all the citizens of their
common right. It would be a grievance which never could be long
83
borne by a free people.

This passage is susceptible to at least two interpretations: as
prohibiting the transfer of any stated-owned water, or as prohibiting

78. Id. at 76–77.
79. The court delineates three types of property: private, public, and common. According
to the court, public property is transferable property owned by the government, whereas
common property is inalienable public property “to be held, protected, and regulated for the
common use and benefit.” Id. at 71.
80. Huffman, supra note 17, at 18. Judge Kirkpatrick, writing for the New Jersey Supreme
Court, simply misunderstood the common law of England and the practical impotence of the
Magna Carta with respect to wildlife alienation by the sovereign.
81. Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 13 .
82. Id.
83. Id. at 78.
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the transfer of all “the waters of the state.” The latter is more
reasonable for two reasons. First, by New Jersey law, individuals
owning lands adjacent to tidal waters “wherein oysters do or will
84
grow” could plant and have the exclusive right of harvesting oysters.
Second, the New Jersey Supreme Court later reversed Arnold and in
so doing confirmed the legislature’s authority to limit public access
85
via alienation to private parties.
Despite being overturned, Arnold stands as the first articulation
of the public trust doctrine as a significant, though not absolute,
restraint on the ability of state governments to alienate state waters
and the wildlife in those waters.
The United States Supreme Court repeated this expanded notion
of the public trust doctrine and laid the foundation for state
86
ownership of wildlife in the 1842 case Martin v. Waddell, a tidal land
case very similar to Arnold. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice
Taney explained, “[w]hen the people of New Jersey took possession
of the reins of government, and took into their own hands the powers
of sovereignty, the prerogatives and regalities which before belonged
to either the crown or the parliament, became immediately and
87
rightly vested in the state.” Thus, according to the Supreme Court,
the citizens of New Jersey held in common the navigable waters,
submerged lands, and the wildlife lying thereon.
The Court described how, under common law, the English crown
could transfer trust lands but that such transfers were strictly
construed so as to limit the alienation of commonly owned
88
resources. The Supreme Court then suggested that the powers of

84. Act of June 9, 1820, 1820 N.J. Laws 162 (providing for the preservation of clams and
oysters).
85. Gough v. Bell, 22 N.J.L. 441, 459 (N.J. 1850) (“If, by this proposition, it is meant only
to assert that a grant of all the waters of the state, to the utter destruction of the rights of
navigation and fishery, would be an insufferable grievance, it is undoubtedly true . . . . But if it
be intended to deny the power of the legislature, by grant, to limit common rights or to
appropriate lands covered by water to individual enjoyment, to the exclusion of the public
common rights of navigation or fishery, the position is too broadly stated.”).
86. 41 U.S. 367 (1842).
87. Id. at 416.
88. Id. at 411. (“The dominion and property in navigable waters and the lands under them
being held by the King as a public trust, the grant to an individual of an exclusive fishery in any
portion of it is so much taken from the common fund entrusted to his care for the common
benefit. In such cases, whatever does not pass by the grant remains in the Crown for the benefit
and advantage of the whole community. Grants of that description are therefore, construed
strictly, and it will not be presumed that the King intended to part from any portion of the
public domain unless clear and special words are used to denote it.”).
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alienation held by state governments could exceed those held by the
English crown at common law, presumably because the state
legislature is a better representative of the public than was the
89
English monarch.
Decades later, in the famous case of Illinois Central Railroad Co.
90
v. Illinois, the Court defined those “different principles” and the
category of sovereign transfers that are consistent with the public
trust doctrine. Illinois Central raised the issue of the validity of a
legislative grant of a significant portion of the Chicago harbor
91
waterfront to a privately owned railroad. In answering that question,
the Court referenced the public trust doctrine and explained that title
to the submerged lands is “a title held in trust for the people of the
state, that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on
commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein, freed from
92
the obstruction or interference by private parties.”
The Supreme Court explained that, while the public trust
doctrine prohibited Illinois from transferring control “over lands
under the navigable waters of an entire harbor or bay, or of a sea or
lake,” and thus the legislative grant in question, it did not preclude
transfers of trust property to private parties that aided in the public
93
interest. According to the Court,
[t]he interest of the people in the navigation of the waters and in
commerce over them may be improved in many instances by the
erection of wharves, docks, and piers therein, for which purpose the
state may grant parcels of the submerged lands; and, so long as
their disposition is made for such purpose, no valid objections can
be made to the grants. It is grants of parcels of lands under
navigable waters that may afford foundation for wharves, piers,
docks, and other structures in aid of commerce, and grants of
parcels which, being occupied, do not substantially impair the public
interest in the lands and waters remaining, that are chiefly
considered and sustained in the adjudged cases as a valid exercise

89. Id. at 410–11 (“For when the revolution took place, the people of each state became
themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters,
and the soils under them, for their own common use, subject only to the rights since surrendered
by the constitution to the general government. A grant made by their authority must, therefore,
manifestly be tried and determined by different principles from those which apply to grants of
the British crown, when the title is held by a single individual, in trust for the whole nation.”)
(emphasis added).
90. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
91. Id. at 452.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 452–53.
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of legislative power consistently with the trust to the public upon
94
which such lands are held by the state.

The Supreme Court thus recognized the distinction between a
state’s wholesale abdication of its trust obligation and some lesser
alienation of trust property that aids in the purpose of the public
trust. According to the Court, “[t]he control of the state for the
purposes of the trust can never be lost, except as to such parcels as
are used in promoting the interests of the public therein, or can be
disposed of without any substantial impairment of the public interest
95
in the lands and waters remaining.”
Four years later, the United States Supreme Court would repeat
this distinction in a case specifically dealing with state wildlife
96
regulation under the public trust doctrine. Tracing the history of
sovereign control of game species through Roman and common law,
Justice White explained:
While the fundamental principles upon which the common
property in game rests have undergone no change, the development
of free institutions has led to the recognition of the fact that the
power or control lodged in the State, resulting from the common
ownership, is to be exercised, like all other powers of government,
as a trust for the benefit of all people, and not as a prerogative for
the advantage of government, as distinct from the people, or for the
97
benefit of private individuals as distinguished from the public good.

This passage is important for two reasons: first, it confirms the
states’ trust obligations regarding wildlife management; second, it
articulates the flexibility of the trust relationship terms. According to
the Court’s explanation, this trust relationship precludes state wildlife
management policies that benefit the government or private
individuals instead of the public, but it does not preclude the
management of trust resources for the benefit of private individuals
and the public. This distinction is important because it allows for
wildlife management policies that share the rents of publicly owned
wildlife with the private landowners and for states to transfer a full or
partial ownership stake in wildlife to private landowners who steward
the wildlife for the public benefit.
Several legal commentators have depicted the public trust
doctrine as absolutely precluding state governments from transferring
trust resources, including wildlife, or sharing with private landowners
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 453.
Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
Id. at 529 (emphasis added).
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98

the rents derived from shared habitat production. As explained
above, this characterization has no historical basis. As far back as
ancient Rome, private landowners could prevent members of the
public from hunting or fishing communally owned wildlife on private
land. Under English common law, private landowners could establish
ownership of wildlife by providing habitat to certain wildlife species
and, in some instances, by sovereign grant. And in the foundational
American cases, the public trust doctrine only limited sovereign
transfers of trust resources that were inconsistent with the public’s
benefit. Expanding the public trust doctrine beyond these historical
foundations to preclude all transfers of trust property would likely
perpetuate the split ownership conflicts that currently characterize
wildlife management.
III. RANCHING FOR WILDLIFE
The history of the public trust doctrine supports the assertion
that states can transfer an ownership interest in wildlife resources to
private landowners. Even grants of exclusive access and control are
99
permissible if they advance the public interest. To be sure, states can
expressly curtail the resources and uses protected by the public trust
100
doctrine, supplant the doctrine with comprehensive environmental
101
102
regulatory schemes, expand public access rights, or restrict the
alienability of trust resources more narrowly than is proscribed by the

98. See Sax supra note 17, at 490 (“When a state holds a resource which is available for the
free use of the general public, a court will look with considerable skepticism
upon any government conduct which is calculated either to reallocate that resource to more
restricted uses or to subject public uses to the self-interest of private parties.”).
99. See Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 411 (1842) (“The dominion and property in
navigable waters and the lands under them being held by the King as a public trust, the grant to
an individual of an exclusive fishery in any portion of it is so much taken from the common fund
entrusted to his care for the common benefit.”) (emphasis added).
100. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 58-1203 (expressly limiting the doctrine to submerged
lands under navigable waters); Caminiti v. Boyle, 732 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1987) (applying the
doctrine to tidelands and shorelands and distinguishing between the alienable jus privatum, or
private property interest, and the inalienable jus publicum, or public authority interest in the
context of allowing a statute that permits private property owners to install private recreational
docks on abutting state property without paying a fee). But see Weden v. San Juan County, 958
P.2d 273, 284 (Wash. 1998) (rejecting the notion that the doctrine would “sanction an activity
that actually harms and damages the waters and wildlife of this state”).
101. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30, §§ 61–62 (West 2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 324.
1701–06 (1999).
102. See Mont. Coalition of Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 171 (Mont. 1984) (using
the public trust doctrine to create a public right of access over privately owned stream beds
underlying all water ways in the state capable of recreational use).
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103

bedrock common law principles. Nonetheless, the argument that the
public trust doctrine, by vesting wildlife ownership in the states,
precludes states from alienating wildlife resources or delegating
wildlife management authority is unfounded. Free from these
assumed limitations, states have significant flexibility to contract with
private landowners to overcome the issues of public access, property
damage, and rent allocation that arise from the split wildlife estate.
One model for unifying the split wildlife estate that has gained
104
traction in recent years is called “ranching for wildlife.” Though the
name elicits images of high-fenced game ranching, ranching for
wildlife (RFW) actually describes state managed programs that use
cooperative agreements between landowners and wildlife agencies to
105
improve the quality of free-roaming wildlife populations. States
106
with RFW programs encourage eligible landowners to invest time,
money, and resources in wildlife habitat improvements and expanded
107
hunting opportunities on their properties. In return for these
investments, states modify their hunting regulations to allow enrolled
landowners greater flexibility to manage and profit from the public’s
108
wildlife.
The details of each state’s program are unique and vary
according to the objectives of the wildlife department, private
109
landowners, and the state’s legislature. To get a sense of how RFW
can address the issues arising from a split wildlife estate, consider the
specifics of Colorado’s program, Colorado Ranching for Wildlife. The
objectives of the program are to improve public access and
recreational opportunities, preserve and protect wildlife habitat,
improve and enhance wildlife habitat, more effectively implement
species management plans, decrease or mitigate game damage, and
improve relationships between Colorado Parks and Wildlife (CPW),

103. See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct., 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
104. This is an umbrella term used to describe various landowner incentive programs in the
West.
105. LEAL & GREWELL, supra note 13, at 1.
106. Id. at 17. California, Colorado, New Mexico, and Utah, among others, have developed
ranching for wildlife programs with several thousands of private acres enrolled. Several other
Western states have fledging programs with fewer acres enrolled. Id.
107. Id. at 1.
108. Id. at 2.
109. See id. at 17–18 (providing an overview of each program’s structure and size).
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private landowners, and hunters. To achieve those objectives at the
lowest administrative cost, CPW targets large ranches and limits
enrollment in the program to properties with at least 10,000
111
112
contiguous acres. Twenty-nine ranches are currently enrolled.
As a prerequisite to enrollment, petitioning landowners and staff
from CPW must agree to a management plan that specifies objective
performance criteria for habitat improvements for game and nongame species, species management, free public hunting access, and
113
hunter satisfaction. Based on the landowner’s performance under
these management objectives, CPW will lengthen hunting seasons
114
and increase harvest limits on the property. These regulatory
modifications give enrolled landowners more tools for limiting
property damage and crop depredation. However, the primary
incentive for landowners to enroll in the program is to earn
115
transferable big-game hunting permits. These permits entitle the
purchasing hunter to harvest a particular big game animal on the
116
enrolled ranch. Landowners can sell the permits on the open
market, often for thousands of dollars depending on the species and
the quality of the hunting opportunity. The landowners choose to
whom they will sell the permits and are entitled to all of the sale
proceeds. The number of tags issued to the landowner is based on a
tiered system reflecting the amount of habitat enhancements and free
117
public hunting access the landowner provides.

110. COLO. PARKS & WILDLIFE, RANCHING FOR WILDLIFE OPERATING GUIDELINES 1
(2012), available at https://wildlife.state.co.us/SiteCollectionDocuments/DOW/Hunting/
BigGame/Ranching/RFWGuidelines.pdf.
111. Id.
112. COLO. PARKS & WILDLIFE, RANCHING FOR WILDLIFE—RANCH SIZE, LOCATION, &
SPECIES (2013), available at https://wildlife.state.co.us/SiteCollectionDocuments/DOW/Hunting/
BigGame/Ranching/PDF/RanchSizeLocationSpecies.pdf.
113. COLO. PARKS & WILDLIFE, supra note 96, at 5.
114. Id.
115. See id. at 16 (noting allocation of public to private hunting licenses).
116. Id. Most states require a general hunting license for all hunting activity in the state,
plus species and location specific permits for big game animals such as elk, deer, antelope, and
turkey. Though landowners enrolled in Ranching for Wildlife can transfer the permits to
whomever they like, most sell them to non-resident hunters because of the price differential
between resident and non-resident permits. Colorado’s program grants tags for deer, elk,
pronghorn, moose, bighorn sheep, and black bear. Ranching for Wildlife Hunter Information,
COLO. PARKS & WILDLIFE, http://wildlife.state.co.us/Hunting/BigGame/RanchingforWildlife/
Pages/RFWHunterInformation.aspx (last updated Feb. 26, 2013).
117. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 210(E) (2012).
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The public benefits generated by Colorado’s Ranching for
Wildlife program are significant. Participating landowners have
opened up public access to more than one million acres, over 50,000
acres per year have active wildlife habitat improvements applied, and
improved livestock grazing systems have been implemented on
118
approximately eighty percent of the lands enrolled. Programs in
other Western states have had similar success by aligning the
incentives of private landowners with the public’s interest in
119
wildlife.
Despite these successes, critics complain that ranching for
120
wildlife programs constitute an unlawful privatization of wildlife,
and that allowing private landowners to profit from public wildlife is
likely to “destroy the basic policies by which North America’s system
121
of wildlife conservation operates.” Even under the assumption that
enrolled landowners acquire an ownership interest in wildlife under

118. Ranching for Wildlife, COLO. PARKS & WILDLIFE, https://wildlife.state.co.us/hunting/
biggame/ranchingforwildlife/pages/rfw.aspx (last updated Feb. 20, 2013).
119. For example, California’s Private Land Management Program, encompassing over one
million acres, has funded habitat enhancements for deer, elk, pronghorn antelope, wild turkeys,
quail, waterfowl, as well as threatened and endangered species like the bald eagle and redlegged frog. Private Lands Management, CAL. DEP’T FISH & WILDLIFE,
http://www.dfg.ca.gov/wildlife/hunting/plm.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2013). Utah’s Cooperative
Wildlife Management Units have opened more than two million acres of private land to the
public. Cooperative Wildlife Management Units, UTAH DIV. WILDLIFE RES.,
http://wildlife.utah.gov/dwr/about-the-program.html (last updated Oct. 3, 2012). Oklahoma’s
Deer Management Assistance Program has significantly improved the white-tail deer
management on private property, reduced property damage, and improved the data collection
throughout the state. Deer Management Assistance, OKLA. DEP’T WILDLIFE CONSERVATION,
http://www.wildlifedepartment.com/wildlifemgmt/deermanagement.htm (last visited Mar. 9,
2013).
120. See John Gibson, Ranching for Wildlife: Commercializing Public Wildlife, MONT.
STANDARD (Nov. 6, 2008), http://www.plwa.org/viewarticle.php?id=84 (describing ranching for
wildlife programs as a violation of the public trust doctrine); Chris Marchion, Ranching Model
Doesn’t Work: Wildlife Management Technique Has Failed in Western States, MISSOULIAN (Nov.
13,
2008),
http://missoulian.com/news/opinion/editorial/article_7043df6d-dcc8-5489-8d88b758681dd779.html (“This approach returns wildlife to private commerce, animal husbandry
and gives control of who gets a hunting license for use on specific private lands to participating
landowners. While such a program has been tried in some Western states, it has failed to
produce anticipated benefits for landowners, wildlife management and public opportunities.”);
Public Ownership of Wildlife & the Threat of Privatization, MONT. WILDLIFE FED.,
http://www.montanawildlife.com/publications/huntingfishingfuture.htm (predicting ranching for
wildlife would undermine the state’s cultural heritage and violate the public trust doctrine) (last
visited Mar. 21, 2013); Tyler Baskfied, Ranching for Wildlife Program Criticized, CRAIG DAILY
PRESS (July 6, 2000), http://www.craigdailypress.com/news/2000/jul/06/ranching_for_wildlife/
?print.
121. Geist, supra note 40, at 16; see also Horner, supra note 18, at 29; Meyers, supra note 18.
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122

ranching for wildlife contracts, RFW programs still comport with
the historical guidelines of the public trust doctrine and the state’s
role as trustee. First, the interest transferred does not amount to a
total abdication of the state’s fiduciary obligations, as prohibited by
Illinois Central and the basic principles of private trust law. Rather, it
constitutes a sharing of wildlife management authority and the
resulting revenues. The state wildlife agency retains control over the
number of transferrable permits issued and the conditions by which
those permits can issue. The state agency also holds discretionary
authority over whether to approve or deny enrollment applications;
no ranching for wildlife programs have automatic enrollment
provisions. Thus, any management authority or ownership interest
transferred under such a program is partial and revocable. In this
way, it is more akin to the transfer of submerged land underlying a
dock in Chicago’s harbor than the entire harbor itself, and more
similar to a private trustee hiring janitorial service than delegating all
of her fiduciary obligations.
Secondly, any transfers of ownership or delegations of
management authority accomplished by ranching for wildlife
programs satisfy the public trust doctrine’s requirement of advancing
123
the public interest. Recall that the enrolled landowner’s receipt of
the transferable permits is conditioned on his or her performance of
specific habitat enhancements and provision of public hunting
opportunities. Though landowners profit from participation, the
program provides a net benefit to both the landowners and the state.
The transferable permits motivate the private landowners to better
steward the public’s wildlife and to increase public hunting access on
land that might otherwise be totally inaccessible. This quid pro quo
contract grows the proverbial pie of wildlife benefits such that the

122. Ample authority suggests such an ownership interest is severely limited by the public
trust, if it exists at all. See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709,
723 (Cal. 1983) (explaining that “the grantee [of trust property] holds subject to the trust, and
while he may assert a vested right to the servient estate (the right to use subject to the trust) and
to any improvements he erects, he can claim no vested right to bar recognition of the trust or
state action to carry out its purpose.”). See also generally Anna R.C. Casperson, Public Trust
Doctrine and the Impossibility of Takings by Wildlife, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 357 (1996).
123. The stated objectives of Colorado’s RFW Program speak to the way in which it
harnesses landowner incentives and enhances the public’s interest in the wildlife trust property.
These include (a) improving public access and recreational opportunities; (b) preserving and
protecting wildlife habitat; (c) improving and enhancing wildlife habitat; (d) more effectively
implementing species management plans; (e) decreasing or mitigating game damage; and (f)
improving relationships between the Department of Wildlife, landowners, and sportsmen.
COLO. PARKS & WILDLIFE, supra note 110, at 1.

Watson (Do Not Delete)

316

5/19/2013 10:43 PM

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

[Vol. XXIII:291

public’s transfer of an ownership interest in wildlife ultimately
generates more wildlife benefits for the public.
In sum, landowner incentive programs such as ranching for
wildlife overcome the split estate issues by aligning the incentives of
private landowners with the public’s interest in wildlife—they
“harmonize the public’s interest in sustaining wildlife populations
with the landowner’s desire to manage wildlife on his or her
124
property.” When private landowners view wildlife as an asset rather
than a liability, they are more likely to be good wildlife stewards.
IV. BARTERING IN BISON
A non-game example of a more unified wildlife estate can be
found on media mogul Ted Turner’s Green Ranch near Bozeman,
Montana. The property is home to a herd of bison from Yellowstone
125
National Park that is considered genetically pure and closely related
126
to the historic Great Plains bison. The story of how the herd came
to Turner’s ranch—not by migrating but by a memorandum of
understanding—shows that public-private wildlife partnerships can
enhance the health and value of wildlife resources. It also reveals how
an expansive and historically unfounded interpretation of the public
trust doctrine could discourage stewardship and destroy the value of
wildlife resources.
The story starts with a disease called Brucella abortus
(brucellosis). Brucellosis causes miscarriage, infertility, and reduced
127
milk production in cattle and flu-like symptoms in humans.
Scientists debate whether bison can transmit brucellosis to livestock,
but most agree that approximately fifty percent of the Yellowstone
128
Park bison test positive for the disease. If multiple brucellosis
outbreaks occur in a single state within a twelve-month period, the

124. LEAL & GREWELL, supra note 13, at 12.
125. See R.O. Polzhiehn et al., Bovine mtDNA Discovered in North American Bison
Populations, 9 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1638 (1995); Jim Robbins, Out West, With the Buffalo,
Roam Some Strands of Undesirable DNA, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2007, at F2 (most American bison
in the United States have some bovine genetics).
126. Mont.-Turner Bison Agreement Challenged, MONT. STANDARD (Aug. 25, 2012),
http://mtstandard.com/news/local/state-and-regional/mont—turner-bison-agreement-challenged/
article_bafe715a-ee6c-11e1-8e93-001a4bcf887a.html.
127. U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., BRUCELLOSIS AND YELLOWSTONE BISON 1 (2007), available at
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/animal_dis_spec/cattle/downloads/cattle-bison.pdf.
128. Jack C. Rhyan et al., Pathogens and Epidemiology of Brucellosis in Yellowstone Bison:
Serologic and Culture Results from Adult Females and Their Progeny, 45 J. WILDLIFE DISEASES
729, 730 (2009).
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U.S. Department of Agriculture can revoke the state’s brucellosisfree certification triggering extensive testing and vaccination
129
130
protocols and reducing the marketability of the state’s livestock.
131
In short, Yellowstone Park bison and cattle do not mix.
In an attempt to fix the problem, a coalition of state and federal
agencies began a quarantine feasibility study to develop procedures
132
for certifying brucellosis-free bison. The objective was to transplant
Yellowstone bison outside the Park to augment existing populations
near extinction and to ensure that the bison population inside the
133
Park does not exceed carrying capacity. As part of the five-year
program, an initial herd of 100 bison calves was quarantined and
134
serially tested for brucellosis. In March 2009, Montana Fish,
Wildlife & Parks (FWP) completed an environmental assessment for
the placement of the first group of quarantined bison on the Wind
135
River Reservation of the Northern Arapaho Tribe in Wyoming.
Before the animals were moved, the Tribe rescinded their offer to
accept the bison because it had been unable to secure the necessary
136
facilities. In November 2009, the bison quarantine facility reached
its maximum capacity, requiring the immediate relocation of the
137
eighty-eight bison remaining from the original herd.
Earlier, in June 2009, FWP had published a request for proposals
announcing the availability of the brucellosis-free bison, the
conservation objectives of the translocation effort, and the criteria for

129. See MONT. ADMIN. R. §§ 32.3.411–32.3.437 (defining the testing and vaccination
procedures for livestock operations in the designated surveillance area bordering Yellowstone
National Park).
130. M. Jeff Hagener, Concerns about Brucellosis in Montana, MAGAZINE MONT. FISH,
WILDLIFE & PARKS, http://fwp.mt.gov/mtoutdoors/HTML/director/2008/SO08.htm (last visited
Mar. 20, 2013) (Brucellosis outbreaks did occur in Montana in 2007 and 2008, causing the state
to lose its brucellosis-free certification).
131. See U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., supra note 127, at 2. During the harsh winter of 1996 to
1997, thousands of bison began to migrate out of Yellowstone in search of food. Their migration
pattern crossed over National Forest land and private ranches where cattle grazed. Given the
potential for transmission, federal and state officials attempted to haze the bison back onto park
land. Id. When those efforts failed, officials shot or sent to slaughter 1,079 bison. Id. An
additional 1,300 starved to death inside the Park. Id.
132. MONTANA FISH, WILDLIFE, & PARKS, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, BISON
TRANSLOCATION, BISON QUARANTINE PHASE IV (2010), available at fwp.mt.gov/
fwpDoc.html?id=41816.
133. Id. at 6–7.
134. Id.
135. See generally id.
136. Id. at 6–7.
137. Id.

Watson (Do Not Delete)

318

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

5/19/2013 10:43 PM

[Vol. XXIII:291

138

the facilities needed to house and continue testing the herd. FWP
139
received seven proposals and chose Turner’s proposal on the basis
of available carrying capacity, fencing, the ability to keep the bison
separate from livestock, and the ability to comply with the feasibility
140
study’s testing protocols.
Because Turner would bear the cost of relocating, feeding, caring
for, and otherwise maintaining the herd until the end of the five-year
research period, the memorandum of understanding specified that
Turner would retain seventy-five percent of the offspring born during
141
his stewardship. FWP explained how the quid-pro-quo would
advance the objectives of the feasibility study and bison conservation,
generally:
This portion of the proposed action will help serve the objectives of
the research project, will serve to propagate a brucellosis-free herd
of bison, and will encourage partners of this research project to
carry out future conservation and restoration efforts of
Yellowstone bison. In the case of TEI, the remaining QF progeny
may be used to increase the genetic diversity of TEI’s Castle Rock
bison herd in northern New Mexico. That herd, which originated in
Yellowstone Park in the 1930s, has been managed as a closed herd
since then and has been identified by Texas A&M as genetically
142
“pure” and unique.

Nonetheless, and perhaps not surprisingly, several groups
immediately sued FWP, arguing that the transfer of a portion of the
quarantined herd’s progeny violated the public trust by privatizing
143
public wildlife. The cashless nature of the agreement is the
plaintiffs’ primary focus. Glenn Hockett with the Gallatin Wildlife

138. Id.
139. See id. at 7 (listing the applicants as the Fort Belknap Indian Community, Turner
Enterprises, Inc., Chicago Zoological Society, Billings Zoo, Wildlife Conservation Society, and
two other private entities).
140. Memorandum of Understanding between Montana Fish, Wildlife & Parks, Montana
Department of Wildlife, and Turner Enterprises, Inc (Feb. 16, 2010), available at
http://www.buffalofieldcampaign.org/legislative/quarantine/Turner_bison_agreement_signed_fe
b_2010.pdf.
141. Id. at 3.
142. MONTANA FISH, WILDLIFE, & PARKS, supra note 132, at 13.
143. Complaint at 3, Western Watersheds Project, Gallatin Wildlife Association, Buffalo
Field Campaign, Yellowstone Buffalo Foundation v. State of Montana & Montana Dept. of Fish
Wildlife and Parks (Mont. Dist. Ct. 2010). The plaintiffs have asked the court to “declare FWP’s
attempted privatization of publicly held wildlife a violation of its public trust responsibilities,
enjoin the State/FWP from transferring title to these publicly held bison to a private party, and
remand to FWP with instructions to prepare a full EIS to analyze a full range of alternatives
that would ensure all surviving bison and their offspring are managed as wildlife for
conservation purposes, and not privatized or commercialized.” Id.

Watson (Do Not Delete)

Spring 2013]

5/19/2013 10:43 PM

PUBLIC WILDLIFE ON PRIVATE LAND

319

Association explained, “[t]hey need to remain in public hands. Paying
[Ted Turner] by bartering the public’s wildlife is a violation of the
144
public trust.”
As a threshold issue, the court must decide whether to apply the
public trust doctrine to wildlife as separate from or subsumed in the
agency’s constitutional, statutory, and regulatory obligations.
Montana’s constitution requires that the state “maintain and improve
a clean and healthful environment . . . for present and future
145
generations.” Additionally, FWP is charged with the statutory duty
146
to supervise all the wildlife in the state and the regulatory duty to
“protect, enhance, and regulate the wise use of the state’s wildlife
147
resources for public benefit now and in the future.”
148
Assuming the court does apply the doctrine separately, the
initial inquiry is whether the interest transferred amounts to a total
abdication of the state’s fiduciary obligations. Because the state is
attempting to transfer legal title to the animals, as opposed to a
transferable permit which allows a hunter to establish ownership via
the rule of capture, the issue is closer in this case than in the context
of ranching for wildlife and other permit-based landowner incentive
programs. However, if the court finds that the evidence supports
FWP’s conclusion that no other facility could have taken the bison,
leaving slaughter as the only alternative, it is unlikely to conclude the
149
state abdicated its fiduciary duty as trustee. In other words, if the
decision FWP faced was whether to save all of the living animals from
the original herd plus twenty-five percent of the offspring at the end

144. Lawsuit Challenges Bison Transfer to Ted Turner, BILLINGS GAZETTE (Mar. 23, 2010),
http://billingsgazette.com/news/state-and-regional/montana/lawsuit-challenges-bison-transfer-toted-turner/article_1e0c53b0-36d3-11df-951d-001cc4c002e0.html.
145. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
146. MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-1-201(1). But see MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-1-201(5) (2012)
(authorizing FWP to “dispose of all property owned by the state used for the protection,
preservation, management, and propagation of fish, game, fur-bearing animals, and game and
nongame birds that is of no further value or use to the state”).
147. MONT. ADMIN. R. § 12.1.101(8)(b) (2012).
148. See Redmond, supra note 18, at 252–57 (describing outcomes in different states and
the unpredictability of courts on this issue).
149. See William Corbet, Montana Administrative Law Practice: 41 Years after Enactment of
the Montana Administrative Procedures Act, 73 MONT. L. REV. 339, 384 (2012). In Montana,
courts review an agency record “to determine whether (1) the agency findings of fact are
properly supported by the record evidence, (2) the agency interpretations of law are correct, (3)
the agency properly applied law to fact, and (4) the agency has not abused its discretion on
matters where the court accords the agency discretion.” Id. (citing Hughes v. Mont. Bd. of
Medical Examiners, 80 P.3d 415 (Mont. 2003)).
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of the study period, or to save none, the agency could hardly be
faulted for abdicating its trust duties.
The second requirement of the public trust doctrine is that any
transfers of ownership or delegations of management authority must
be done for the benefit of the public, not “for the benefit of private
150
individuals as distinguished from the public.” No doubt, Turner
Enterprises is deriving a private benefit by acquiring animals from
one of the most genetically pure herds of bison. The question is
whether the public will derive any benefits from the transfer. This
inquiry is not an examination of fairness but rather whether the
private and public interests are conflicting or aligned. By preventing
the slaughter of the quarantined animals and, perhaps more
importantly, by allowing the feasibility study to continue so that more
translocations might occur in the future, the proposed ownership
transfer appears to generate both private and public benefits. As Russ
Miller of Turner Enterprises explained, “We’re not a philanthropy.
We’re trying to create a blend between conservation and
151
commercialization.”
It remains to be seen how the Montana courts will resolve the
152
case. Because the transaction at issue contemplates transferring full
legal title of wild animals to a private enterprise in exchange for the
stewardship of other wild animals and the myriad public benefits that
flow from that stewardship, the court might find it difficult to sidestep the public trust issues. A decision to strike down the agreement
on public trust grounds would further polarize the public wildlifeprivate habitat issue and discourage wildlife agencies and private
landowners from future collaboration. By contrast, a decision to
uphold the agreement as consistent with the public trust doctrine
would set a rare precedent for unifying the split wildlife estate.
VI. CONCLUSION
The split ownership of wildlife and wildlife habitat raises issues
of public access, private property damage, and the division of

150. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529 (1896).
151. Ted Turner’s Bid to House Yellowstone Bison Draws Protest, L.A.TIMES: L.A.
UNLEASHED BLOG (Jan. 12, 2010, 5:04 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/unleashed/2010/01/
bison-ted-turner.html.
152. The case came to trial on March 29, 2013. Laura Lundquist, Turner Bison Case Comes
to Trial, BOZEMAN DAILY CHRON. (Mar. 30, 2013), http://www.bozemandailychronicle.com/
news/wildlife/article_d4830a8c-98ee-11e2-8b8b-001a4bcf887a.html. As of this writing, no ruling
has yet been issued.
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economic rents. Policies that unify ownership can align the financial
incentives of private landowners with the public’s interest in wildlife
stewardship. Revenue sharing programs like ranching for wildlife
have increased public hunting access, improved habitat conditions on
a landscape scale, and given landowners more flexibility to manage
their property. However, as evidenced by the bison barter currently
pending in Montana, even more can be done to unify the split wildlife
estate. The public trust doctrine does not preclude states from
transferring to private parties an ownership interest or management
authority in wildlife; it only requires that such transfers and
delegations are consistent with the state’s fiduciary obligations as
trustee and the public’s interest as the beneficiary.

